A New Chapter: Governance Reforms 28 Years In The Making

UMLS takes cognizance of the Prime Minister’s announcement on the package of agenda reform for 2026 during the New Year Message, to be spearheaded by the Prime Minister’s Department (Law and Institutional Reform). These long-anticipated reforms signal a renewed commitment to strengthening democratic accountability, institutional integrity, and the rule of law in Malaysia.

Overview

These proposed reforms address decades-long systemic imbalances within Malaysia’s system of governance, including the dominance of executive power, limited institutional oversight, and constrained transparency in public administration. However, these proposed measures are contingent upon whether they are supported by clear institutional frameworks, independent safeguards, and effective implementation. The following sections examine key reform proposals with a focus on the conditions necessary to ensure their viability. 

Limiting the Prime Minister’s term of office

The Federal Constitution currently imposes no express limit on how long a Prime Minister may hold office. Under Article 43, a Prime Minister may remain in office as long as they command the confidence of the majority in the Dewan Rakyat.[i] Although this mechanism reflects parliamentary accountability, reliance on confidence alone may allow prolonged overreach of executive power, particularly in political systems characterised by strong party discipline and executive influence over legislative processes.

We assert that a clear 10-year or two-term limit is essential to prevent the emergence of “strongman” leadership. Without a fixed tenure cap, there is a risk of a single leader hegemonizing the administration and dictating decisions made by various government bodies. We must move beyond the fallacy that parliamentary confidence alone is a sufficient check as history demonstrates that long-serving leaders inevitably fall into the trap of eroding the independence of the very institutions meant to oversee them.[ii]

Thus, it is vital for this reform to be entrenched via a Constitutional Amendment, transforming it from a promise into an immutable legal barrier against consolidation of power. 

Separation of the roles of the Attorney General & Public Prosecutor

Under the current constitutional framework, the Attorney General serves both as the Government’s legal adviser and as the Public Prosecutor, combining advisory and prosecutorial functions within a single office. This dual role has long raised concerns about perceived conflicts of interest, particularly in cases involving the executive or politically sensitive prosecutions. The concentration of prosecutorial discretion in an office appointed on executive advice risks undermining prosecutorial independence and eroding public confidence in the administration of justice.[iii]

UMLS highlights that these risks are not merely theoretical but have manifested in significant institutional controversies. We recall the widespread concern from legal groups regarding the 2018 appointment of Tommy Thomas as Attorney General.[iv] Critics at the time argued that appointing a sitting minister’s personal counsel to the office of the Attorney General, especially when that minister had an ongoing corruption trial, created a manifest conflict of interest. Such appointments risk the perception of cronyism, as the Attorney General is placed in a precarious position between his duty to the office and his prior confidentiality privileges to political clients.    

Malaysia’s constitutional history illustrates how excessive executive influence over legal institutions can weaken the rule of law. The abrupt removal of the sixth Attorney General, Tan Sri Datuk Seri Panglima Abdul Gani Patail in 2015, showcased the flaw in these overlapping interests. This came after his statement that he had received incriminating documents from an official special task force probe on 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB).[v] The episode underscored the vulnerability of legal institutions when adequate structural safeguards are absent.

To address this, a system of complete separation similar to that adopted in India has been proposed. Under Article 76 of the Indian Constitution, the Attorney General has no prosecutorial role, with criminal prosecutions vested in Public Prosecutors under the Criminal Procedure Code 1973. This model strengthens prosecutorial independence, enhances public confidence in justice, and reduces the risk of executive influence.[vi] 

Accordingly, UMLS also emphasises that separating the offices of the Attorney General and Public Prosecutor must be accompanied by a viable institutional replacement for prosecutorial decision-making. One workable model is an independent prosecution service similar to the United Kingdom’s Crown Prosecution Service (CPS),[vii] which exercises prosecutorial discretion independently of the executive, operates under transparent prosecution guidelines, and is subject to parliamentary accountability rather than ministerial direction.[viii] Malaysian Bar submissions similarly describe conflict-of-interest risks when the Attorney General is both government legal adviser and Public Prosecutor, and support full separation.[ix] 

Hence, to ensure the viability of the proposed Law Reform (Public Prosecutor) Bill 2026, UMLS calls for amendments to the Federal Constitution to establish the Attorney General and the Public Prosecutor as distinct, and independent offices. Such reforms must include adequate safeguards to protect prosecutorial independence from executive influence to prevent the recurrence of the 2015 institutional trauma. 

The Enactment of Freedom Of Information Act

The right to information is internationally acknowledged under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Unlike Australia, India, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, Malaysia has yet to have federal legislation that provides freedom of information.[x] Currently, only Selangor[xi] and Penang[xii] have established specific statutory frameworks governing freedom of information.

In Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor, Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram in his judgment stated that “Article 10 contains certain express and, by interpretive implication, other specific freedoms. For example, the freedom of speech and expression are expressly guaranteed by Article 10(1)(a). The right to be derived from the express protection is the right to receive information, which is equally guaranteed.”[xiii] Accordingly, freedom of information is intrinsic to Article 10 of the Federal Constitution as access to information is essential for meaningful exercise of the freedom of speech and expression.

However, in the absence of relevant federal legislation, the courts remain reluctant to fully recognise and enforce freedom of information. The Court of Appeal in Haris Fatillah B. Mohd Ibrahim v Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia declined to recognise freedom of information in Malaysia and refused to rely on decisions from other Commonwealth jurisdictions, reasoning that the Federal Constitution can never be overridden by the extraneous principles of other Constitutions.[xiv] Nevertheless, in the judicial review application of Harris bin Mohd Salleh v Chief Secretary, Government of Malaysia & Ors, the High Court held that the right to information exists as a corollary to the right to freedom of speech.[xv] Taken together, these cases highlight the pressing need for clear legislative guidelines to assist the courts in effectively determining the extent of freedom of information, thereby upholding the freedom of speech.

The Freedom of Information Act enhances government openness and transparency while safeguarding citizens’ democratic rights, as public oversight can deter corruption and the abuse of power. Furthermore, access to information is an essential element of citizenship. Without sufficient information, voters are unable to make well-informed decisions grounded in careful deliberation.[xvi] 

Nonetheless, the enactment of the Act faces legal obstacles under the current legal framework. Malaysia’s current information regime is tightly regulated by the Official Secrets Act 1972 (OSA), which broadly excludes classified information from disclosure for any purpose, unless such information was declassified by the relevant authority.[xvii]

Although the Federal Constitution does not expressly state that freedom of information is a component of freedom of speech and expression, it is reasonably foreseeable that without such a right, an open, transparent, and responsive democracy cannot be achieved. HRH Sultan Azlan Shah, in a public lecture at Universiti Sains Malaysia on 19.12.1986 also observed that the absolute discretion conferred upon the executive is extensive and far-reaching, which significantly limits the judiciary’s ability to scrutinise and control any excessive exercise of these powers by the government.[xviii] 

The Official Secrets Act 1972, which was originally modelled on the UK’s Official Secrets Acts of 1911 and 1920, must be reconsidered in light of modern developments. Currently, many jurisdictions have evolved in terms of governmental secrecy. The United Kingdom operates the Freedom of Information Act alongside the Official Secrets Act,[xix] India has enacted the Right to Information Act,[xx] and Canadian jurisprudence recognises the right to information in Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[xxi]

Accordingly, UMLS urges the government to adopt an appropriate approach to align the Official Secrets Act 1972 with freedom of information principles, balancing transparency and accountability with national security interests.

The Establishment of Independent Ombudsman Institution

Whistleblower protection in Malaysia faces inadequacy, as it does not sufficiently assure individuals of their safety when reporting wrongdoing, particularly within the public service. Under the existing framework, whistleblowers are required to report misconduct to enforcement agencies, which raises concerns regarding mutual trust, especially where such agencies may be directly or indirectly implicated in the alleged wrongdoing.[xxii]

Moreover, Malaysia lacks an independent oversight mechanism for public administration and service delivery. Complaints are usually handled internally with limited access to the Public Complaints Bureau, which operates under the Prime Minister’s department. Thus, it is evident that the establishment of a Malaysian Ombudsman, providing citizens with an impartial and independent channel to report misconduct or bureaucratic abuse is crucial. By ensuring that complaints are addressed by a neutral body rather than the agencies involved, the Ombudsman would enable Malaysians to raise their complaints regarding public service and foster transparency and accountability in the government.[xxiii]

The effectiveness of the Ombudsman institution highly depends on its proper implementation. The success of the Swedish model provides a useful reference for Malaysia. To function effectively, the Ombudsman must operate independently, free from political influence or interference by government agencies. It also requires implementing user-friendly complaint mechanisms, ensuring timely publication of investigation reports, and clear communication to the public about the Ombudsman’s roles and responsibilities. Its mandate, powers, and procedures must be clearly and comprehensively defined to guarantee the Ombudsman’s authority, provide access to relevant information, and enable the recommendation of appropriate corrective measures.[xxiv]

Importantly, the role of the Ombudsman does not stop in addressing individual complaints, it is also extended to promote systemic improvements in governance by providing recommendations for broader policy or procedural reforms, thereby enhancing accountability and efficiency across the public sector. Furthermore, if the Malaysian Ombudsman was granted the power to enforce its own decisions, it may turn into another type of court or tribunal.[xxv]

The effective implementation of the Ombudsman institution complements the Freedom of Information Act to strengthen transparency, reinforce democratic accountability and provide institutional checks against the abuse of power.

Conclusion

Resonating with the words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, “Sunlight is the best disinfectant,” the four reform plans announced by the Prime Minister, limiting the Prime Minister’s term, separating the roles of the Attorney General and Public Prosecutor, enacting a Freedom of Information Act, and establishing an independent Ombudsman institution, if effectively implemented would definitely represent significant steps toward strengthening governmental transparency, accountability, and the rule of law in Malaysia. Therefore, it is a firm standpoint of UMLS that these reforms must move beyond political rhetoric and be implemented through concrete and enforceable legal frameworks to ensure impactful and long-lasting reform. UMLS appreciates the MADANI government’s reform initiatives and stands ready to engage in constructive dialogue to ensure these reforms are carried through to successful completion.

Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this press statement do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Faculty of Law, Universiti Malaya, and Universiti Malaya respectively. The UM Law Society only intends to provide our collective view on this issue from an academic legal perspective. 

Universiti Malaya Law Society (UMLS) 25/26

9 January 2026

Email: lawsocietyum@gmail.com

Website: www.umlawsociety.com 

“The Will To Do, The Soul To Dare”

[i] Federal Constitution (Malaysia), art 43.

[ii] Andrew Harding, ‘The 1988 Constitutional Crisis in Malaysia’ (1990) 39(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 57 <https://doi.org/10.1093/iclqaj/39.1.57> accessed 9 January 2026

[iii] Michelle Lee, ‘Separating prosecutorial power from the Attorney-General’s office: a probable solution’ Malaysian Centre for Constitutionalism & Human Rights (20 March 2024).

[iv] ‘Appointing Tommy Thomas as AG promotes cronyism, Malaysia’s lawyer groups say’ The Straits Times (4 June 2018) <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/appointing-tommy-thomas-as-ag-promotes-cronyism-malaysias-lawyer-groups-say> accessed 9 January 2026

[v] ‘Gani Patail replaced as attorney-general shocker’ Malaysiakini (28 July 2015) <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/306399> accessed 9 January 2026

[vi] Constitution of India, art 76.

[vii] Crown Prosecution Service, About CPS Crown Prosecution Service, About CPS <https://www.cps.gov.uk/about-cps> accessed 9 January 2026 accessed 9 January 2026

[viii] Crown Prosecution Service, The Code for Crown Prosecutors <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors> accessed 9 January 2026

[ix] Malaysian Bar, Kertas-Kertas Cadangan Reformasi Institusi dan Undang-Undang: Separation of the Role of Public Prosecutor from the Attorney General, Part D <https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/cms/upload_files/document/D.%20Attorney%20General%E2%80%99s%20Chambers%20and%20Public%20Prosecutor%20-%20ILRC%20Submission.pdf> .

[x] Lee Jia Chern, ‘Freedom of Information in Malaysia-Harris Bin Mohd Salleh v. Chief Secretary, Government of Malaysia & Ors.’ [2024] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies., 170-180.

[xi] Freedom of Information (State of Selangor) Enactment 2011

[xii] Penang Freedom of Information Enactment 2010

[xiii] Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2010] 2 MLJ 333

[xiv] Haris Fatillah B Mohd Ibrahim v Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia [2017] MLJU 45

[xv] Harris bin Mohd Salleh v Chief Secretary, Government of Malaysia & Ors [2023] MLJU 424

[xvi] Muhammad Izwan Ikhsan, Lenny James Matah, ‘Enacting Freedom of Information Act in Malaysia: A Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2022) 7(2) MJSSH <https://doi.org/10.47405/mjssh.v7i2.1297> accessed 6 January 2026 

[xvii] See footnote 16 above

[xviii] See footnote 15 above 

[xix] Freedom of Information Act 2000 (UK) 

[xx] Right to Information Act 2005 (Act No. 22) (India). 

[xxi] See footnote 14 above; The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

[xxii] Mohd Al Omar Che Abu Bakar, Mazlina Mohamad Mangsor, ‘It’s Not Enough to Speak, But to Speak True: Revisiting the Whistleblower Protection Law in Malaysia’ (2022) 7(11) MJSSH <https://doi.org/10.47405/mjssh.v7i11.1949> accessed 7 January 2026

[xxiii] Pushpan Murugiah, ‘My Say: The Case for an Ombudsman Office” (The Edge Malaysia, 29 July 2024) <https://theedgemalaysia.com/node/720696> accessed 7 January 2026

[xxiv] Mohd Helmi Abu Yahya, Norhafiza Mohd Hed, ‘Towards the Establishment of Ombudsman in Malaysia: What can we learn from Sweden?’ (2023) 9(SI22) Environment-Behaviour Proceedings Journal <https://doi.org/10.21834/e-bpj.v9iSI22.5876> accessed 7 January 2026

[xxv] See footnote 22 above

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