Reform Without Results: Addressing The Failure Of The Term-Limit Vote And The Deliberative Path For The Separation Of Attorney General And Public Prosecutor

Overview

The events of the past week in the Dewan Rakyat have served as a litmus test for Malaysia’s institutional reform agenda, revealing both the fragility of political consensus and the necessity for rigorous legislative scrutiny. As we navigate this transitional period, it has become increasingly clear that the pursuit of a more accountable Malaysia must be defined by systemic integrity rather than political expediency. UMLS is of the view that the pursuit of a more accountable Malaysia must be guided by systemic integrity rather than political expediency.

The Failed Prime Minister Term Limit Vote: Lessons for Constitutional Reform

The proposed constitutional amendment to limit the Prime Minister’s term failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority in Parliament.[i] While the objective of strengthening institutional safeguards remains an important discussion in Malaysia’s constitutional development, the outcome of the vote raises several observations regarding the legislative process surrounding constitutional amendments.

Constitutional amendments require careful parliamentary coordination. The government should ensure that the necessary parliamentary numbers are secured prior to tabling constitutional reform that requires a two-thirds majority.[ii] Such reforms are not ordinary legislative measures as they alter the constitutional framework and therefore require a higher degree of preparation and consensus-building. In this regard, the role of the Chief Whip is particularly significant in ensuring attendance and coordination among Members of Parliament during critical votes. Parliamentary history has shown that constitutional reform proposals may fail not only because of substantive disagreement, but also due to issues of parliamentary coordination and attendance. For example, during the 2015 Hong Kong Legislative Council electoral reform, several pro-government legislators unexpectedly left the chamber before the vote due to a coordination misunderstanding, resulting in the proposal’s decisive defeat. The incident illustrates how coordination failures during a decisive vote can ultimately determine the outcome of a constitutional proposal.[iii]

In addition, UMLS suggests that Parliament may consider exploring limited proxy voting mechanisms for circumstances in which Members of Parliament are unable to attend sittings due to unavoidable reasons such as constituency emergencies or geographic constraints. Malaysia’s parliamentary geography presents unique logistical challenges, with representatives travelling between Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia. In some Westminster legislatures, proxy voting arrangements have been introduced under specific conditions to address such situations. For instance, the United Kingdom House of Commons allows Members of Parliament to authorise another member to cast a vote on their behalf in divisions under defined circumstances.[iv] Similarly, the Parliament of New Zealand permits proxy voting under its Standing Orders, which allow a member to designate another member or a political party to exercise a vote on their behalf, while imposing limits to prevent excessive delegation of voting authority.[v] These examples illustrate how legislatures can introduce limited procedural flexibility while maintaining the integrity of parliamentary voting. Any consideration of similar mechanisms in Malaysia would therefore require appropriate safeguards, such as formal authorisation procedures and limitations on usage, to ensure that parliamentary accountability is preserved while preventing procedural disruptions during critical votes.

Constitutional amendments inherently required broad bipartisan support in order to achieve the constitutionally mandated two-thirds majority. During the debate, some Members of Parliament raised concerns that the amendment might affect the constitutional role of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in appointing the Prime Minister.[vi] However, it is important to recognise that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong exercises this function within the framework of the Federal Constitution. Constitutional provisions that define eligibility for office do not diminish the royal prerogative, but instead clarify the constitutional parameters within which that prerogative operates.

From a comparative perspective, most Westminster parliamentary democracies, including the United Kingdom and Canada, do not impose formal constitutional term limits on their prime ministers. In such systems, leadership tenure is instead determined through parliamentary confidence, internal party dynamics, and electoral outcomes.[vii]

In contrast, Malaysia’s political history demonstrates that dominant political coalitions and influential leaders can remain in power for extended periods. This context explains why discussion on constitutional safeguards, including proposals for term limits, continue to arise in debates on institutional reform. While the absence of formal term limits reflects the traditional flexibility of the Westminster system, Malaysia’s consideration of such a measure is not necessarily inconsistent with democratic principles. Rather, it reflects a broader effort to strengthen institutional safeguards in response to the country’s own political experience.

While some critics argue that the term limits may theoretically constrain democratic choice by restricting the ability of voters or Parliament to retain a long-serving leader, proponents contend that such measures may also function as institutional safeguards against excessive concentration of executive power.[viii] In the Malaysian context, where political authority has historically been strongly centred in the office of the Prime Minister, term limits may contribute to a broader effort to decentralise political power. In this regard, future discussions on reform may also consider complementary measures aimed at reducing the concentration of authority within the Prime Minister’s office. For instance, limiting the ability of a Prime Minister to simultaneously hold multiple ministerial portfolios could further strengthen institutional balance within the executive branch. 

Moving forward, any future attempts to table such constitutional amendments should be accompanied by broader cross-party consultation and clearer public communication regarding the scope and implementation of the proposed reform, and stronger parliamentary coordination to ensure that proposals of constitutional significance receive the level of deliberation and consensus they require. 

Separation of the Attorney General and Public Prosecutor: Ensuring Genuine Institutional Independence

While the attempt to introduce term limits for the Prime Minister did not succeed in the Dewan Rakyat, the broader agenda of institutional reform continues through other constitutional initiatives currently under consideration. One such reform is the proposed separation of the offices of the Attorney General and the Public Prosecutor. Both proposals reflect an ongoing effort to strengthen institutional safeguards and reduce the concentration of executive power within Malaysia’s constitutional framework.

The referral of the Constitution (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2026 to the Parliamentary Special Select Committee (PSSC) is a positive step toward ensuring that constitutional reform is handled with the care it deserves.[ix] Rather than being seen as a delay in the legislative process, this move reflects a willingness to place greater emphasis on careful evaluation and thoughtful discussion. Because constitutional amendments shape the country’s governance framework for years to come, it is both reasonable and necessary that they undergo detailed scrutiny before being adopted.

Recent developments in Parliament highlight why this level of engagement is important when dealing with complex constitutional reforms. The earlier unsuccessful attempt to introduce a term limit for the Prime Minister showed that changes of this scale cannot rely solely on a simple vote in the Dewan Rakyat. Instead, they benefit from broader consultation, careful analysis, and sustained debate so that any proposed reform is thoroughly considered and capable of attracting wide support.

The composition of the committee also strengthens the reform process. With twelve members drawn from both the Government and the Opposition, the PSSC provides a setting where bipartisan dialogue can take place.[x] Since constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in Parliament, early engagement across political lines may help build the level of agreement needed for the reform to succeed, while also reinforcing public confidence in how the legislative process is being carried out.

At the same time, questions remain about whether the proposed separation of the offices of the Attorney General and the Public Prosecutor will truly guarantee institutional independence. Civil society groups such as Bersih have pointed out that if the Executive continues to hold significant influence over the appointment of the Public Prosecutor, the separation could end up being largely symbolic.[xi] For this reason, the PSSC should examine several key safeguards closely. These include the method of appointment, mechanisms for oversight, and the proposed seven-year tenure together with tribunal-based removal procedures. Ensuring that these safeguards are strong and credible is essential so that the Public Prosecutor can carry out prosecutorial decisions independently, free from political pressure or fear of retaliation. 

To maximise transparency and specialized input, the Legal Affairs Division of the Prime Minister’s Department (BHEUU) should adopt a collaborative engagement model. UMLS suggests inviting key non-governmental organisations, such as Bersih and the Bar Council to participate in the process, as stakeholders with a common interest in ensuring a more holistic approach to the constitutional reform process. They could function as part of hybrid working groups during open hours. This open-door approach ensures that the reform process benefits from diverse legal perspectives, shielding the initiative from accusations of being a closed-door bureaucratic exercise.

However, this collaborative spirit must be reconciled with the discretionary nature of current proposals regarding the appointment of the Public Prosecutor. Although the proposed framework removes the Prime Minister from the formal appointment procedure, UMLS submits that indirect executive influence may still arise through the composition of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission, which nominates candidates.

Furthermore, the final Bill must include explicit mechanisms to ensure the Public Prosecutor’s answerability to Parliament. To restore and maintain public trust, the office should not operate in a vacuum. It must be required to submit a comprehensive annual report to the Dewan Rakyat or answer to a dedicated parliamentary oversight committee. This ensures that while the Executive cannot interfere in specific cases, the office remains accountable to the people’s representatives regarding its general policies,performance, and use of public resources.

Financial independence is equally critical to institutional integrity. UMLS recommends that the Public Prosecutor’s salary and budget be charged directly to the Consolidated Fund, mirroring the protected status of superior court judges.[xii] By decoupling the PP’s compensation from the standard executive budgetary process, the office is protected from financial pressure or retaliatory budget cuts. This fiscal autonomy is a necessary prerequisite for a Public Prosecutor to make difficult, high-profile decisions without fear of administrative or economic repercussions from the government of the day. 

Conceptually, we view the proposed institutional reforms as positive strides toward a more mature democracy. The initial optimism surrounding these initiatives prior to their first reading reflects a broad public consensus that such changes are necessary. However, it is undeniable that the procedural implementation remains far from perfection. While the conceptual framework is sound, the specific mechanisms and legal nuances revealed post-tabling suggest significant gaps that must be addressed to ensure genuine accountability rather than mere administrative shifting. Our support is rooted strictly in institutional integrity rather than political convenience. We support the government’s correct procedural move today, just as we will criticize any superficial reforms that provide the illusion of reforms without the legal substance of accountability.

Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this press statement do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Faculty of Law, Universiti Malaya, and Universiti Malaya respectively. The UM Law Society only intends to provide our collective view on this issue from an academic legal perspective. 

Universiti Malaya Law Society (UMLS) 25/26

7 March 2026

Email: lawsocietyum@gmail.com

Website: www.umlawsociety.com 

“The Will To Do, The Soul To Dare”

[i] Tarrence Tan, ‘PM term limit Bill fails to pass’ The Star (3 March 2026) https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2026/03/03/pm-term-limit-bill-fails-to-pass accessed 7 March 2026

[ii] Federal Constitution, art 159

[iii] Li Yang, ‘Successful LegCo election in Hong Kong clear rejection of destabilization attempts’ China Daily (9 December 2025) https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202512/09/WS6937650ca310d6866eb2d8c0.html accessed 7 March 2026

[iv] Richard Kelly, Proxy voting in divisions in the House (House of Commons Library Research Briefing CBP-8359, 5 December 2025) https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8359/ accessed 6 March 2026.

[v] New Zealand House of Representatives, Standing Orders of the House of Representatives

[vi] Syed Jaymal Zahid, ‘Two votes short: Move to limit PM tenure fails in Parliament amid high absenteeism’ Malay Mail (2 March 2026) https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2026/03/02/two-votes-short-move-to-limit-pm-tenure-fails-in-parliament-amid-high-absenteeism/211055 accessed 7 March 2026. 

[vii] Grotz, F., & Helms, L., ‘Making sense of comeback prime ministers, European Political Science Review, 17(4), 711–728. (23 December 2024) doi:10.1017/S1755773924000377

[viii] Khoo Ying Hooi, ‘When two votes become a warning light in Malaysian politics — Khoo Ying Hooi’ Malay Mail (4 March 2026) https://www.malaymail.com/amp/news/what-you-think/2026/03/04/when-two-votes-become-a-warning-light-in-malaysian-politics-khoo-ying-hooi/211210  accessed 7 March 2026.

[ix]Amalia Azmi & Hakim Mahari, ‘[UPDATED] Constitution (Amendment) Bill on AG, public prosecutor roles referred to PSSC’ New Straits Times (3 March 2026) https://www.nst.com.my/amp/news/nation/2026/03/1388930/constitution-amendment-bill-ag-public-prosecutor-roles-referred-pssc accessed 7 March 2026

[x] See footnote 7 above.

[xi]Emir Mahidzar, ‘Civil groups push for independent body to oversee Public Prosecutor amid AG-PP separation plans’ The Edge Malaysia (12 February 2026)

https://theedgemalaysia.com/node/792814 accessed 7 March 2026

[xii] Ida Lim, ‘AG-PP split explained: Key things to know about Malaysia’s massive legal reform’ Malay Mail (2 March 2026)

https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2026/03/03/ag-pp-split-explained-key-things-to-know-about-malaysias-massive-legal-reform/210961 accessed 7 March 2026. 

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